Elvison Capital

Side Letter Playbook: What Large LPs Negotiate That You Can Too

The LPA is the same for everyone in the offering. The side letter is what makes your investment different from the next LP's. Family offices, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds use side letters to customize economics, governance, and information rights. Most of what they ask for is also available to LPs writing $250k checks. The deciding factor is whether you ask.

What a Side Letter Is

A side letter is a private contract between a single LP and the GP that supplements the Limited Partnership Agreement. It is signed alongside the subscription agreement and is generally not disclosed to other LPs. Its provisions only bind the GP and the specific LP who signed it.

The legal mechanic is contract integration. The LPA contains language stating that the partnership's governance is the LPA together with any side letters signed by the GP. The side letter then carves out specific rights or modifications that apply only to the signatory LP. Other LPs see the LPA. They do not see the side letters.

Side letters are universal in institutional fund-raising. The 2024 ILPA principles assume side letters as a default feature of any institutional vehicle. In real estate syndications, side letters are common for LPs writing $1M or more, less common but possible for $250k to $1M, and rare below that threshold. The threshold is not legal. It is purely a function of GP willingness.

Why Side Letters Exist

The LPA is fixed. Once a sponsor finalizes the LPA and circulates the offering, the document stays the same across the entire raise. Modifying the LPA mid-raise creates regulatory and operational friction. The side letter exists to provide flexibility without amending the master document.

The structure also lets the GP price-discriminate. A pension fund committing $25M can negotiate fee breaks that the GP would never extend to the entire LP base. By isolating the concession in a side letter, the GP keeps the fee economics of the master fund intact while still winning the institutional ticket.

For LPs, the side letter is the only realistic mechanism to change the deal. Asking the GP to amend the LPA fails. Asking the GP to sign a side letter is normal commercial practice.

The Most-Favored-Nation Clause

The MFN is the most important single provision in any side letter. It states that if any other LP receives more favorable terms than you in their side letter, you are entitled to elect into those terms. Without an MFN, you have no protection against a later, larger LP getting better economics or governance.

A standard MFN clause
If, on or after the date hereof, the General Partner enters into any side letter, agreement, or other arrangement with any other Limited Partner that grants such Limited Partner more favorable rights, benefits, or terms than those granted to the undersigned Limited Partner under this Side Letter, the General Partner shall promptly disclose such arrangement to the undersigned Limited Partner and offer the undersigned Limited Partner the right to elect to receive the same rights, benefits, or terms, subject to the conditions and obligations set forth therein.

The carve-outs

Sponsors carve out specific categories from MFN coverage. The standard carve-outs:

  • Investor-specific provisions. ERISA, BHCA, and tax-exempt provisions tailored to investor regulatory status.
  • Investment threshold tiers. MFN limited to LPs with equal or smaller commitments. A $5M LP cannot pull benefits negotiated by a $50M LP under this carve-out.
  • Sovereign and governmental investors. Treaty and immunity provisions for sovereign wealth funds.
  • Co-investment economics. Sometimes excluded because they are deal-specific.

How to enforce

The MFN works only if you actually receive disclosure. The clause should require annual disclosure of all side letter terms (with investor identities redacted) and the right to elect into any provision within 30 days of disclosure. Without the disclosure mechanic, the MFN is theoretical.

Push for a positive disclosure obligation, not a negative one. Negative disclosure ("the GP shall provide upon request") puts the burden on the LP to know what to ask for. Positive disclosure ("the GP shall provide annually") is enforceable.

Co-Investment Rights

Co-investment is the right to invest additional capital alongside the fund in a specific deal, on the same economic terms, but without paying management fees or promote on the co-invest portion. For active investors, co-investment is the most economically valuable side letter right.

Three structural variants:

  • Pro-rata co-investment. You receive an offer to co-invest in proportion to your fund commitment. Most common.
  • Last-look co-investment. You see the deal before it goes to other LPs and can take the entire allocation.
  • Threshold-triggered. Co-investment offered only on deals above a defined size, where the fund's pro-rata cannot fund the full equity check.
A typical co-investment provision
To the extent that the General Partner determines that an Investment is too large for the Fund to make on its own and the General Partner offers a co-investment opportunity to one or more investors, the General Partner shall offer the undersigned Limited Partner a pro rata portion of such co-investment opportunity (based on the undersigned's Capital Commitment relative to the aggregate Capital Commitments of all Limited Partners offered such co-investment), on substantially the same economic terms as the Fund's investment, with no management fee or carried interest payable on the co-invest portion, except for reasonable and customary out-of-pocket expenses.

Fee Waivers and Discounts

Fee discounts are common on commitments above defined thresholds. The standard structure is a tiered schedule:

  • $1M to $5M: standard fees
  • $5M to $10M: 25% management fee discount
  • $10M+: 50% management fee discount, possibly also a promote concession

The thresholds and discounts vary widely. The pattern is universal. If you are committing significant capital, ask. The worst response is "no," and the GP will not punish you for the question.

Acquisition fee discounts are also negotiable. A standard 1.5% acquisition fee on a $10M LP commitment generates $150k of fee income. Even a 25 basis point reduction is meaningful and rarely turned down by mid-market sponsors competing for institutional commitments.

Reporting Upgrades

The LPA defines minimum reporting. The side letter is where you upgrade. The standard requests:

  • Monthly unaudited financials instead of quarterly
  • GAAP-prepared financials instead of cash-basis or tax-basis
  • Property-level operating data (rent rolls, T-12 income statements, occupancy)
  • Annual asset valuations (third-party or internal)
  • Audit access (the right to commission your own audit at your expense)
  • Inspection rights upgrades (right to copy and remove documents, not just inspect on-site)
  • Quarterly portfolio review calls
A reporting upgrade clause
In addition to the reports required to be delivered to Limited Partners pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, the General Partner shall deliver to the undersigned Limited Partner: (a) within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar month, an unaudited income statement, balance sheet, and rent roll for each Property; (b) within sixty (60) days following the end of each calendar quarter, a portfolio-level investor report including capital account statement, distribution summary, and asset-by-asset performance metrics; and (c) within one hundred twenty (120) days following the end of each Fiscal Year, an annual valuation of each Property prepared by a third-party appraiser selected by the General Partner.

Key-Man Clauses

The key-man clause defines what happens if a named individual at the GP departs, becomes incapacitated, or no longer devotes substantially all of their time to the fund. The standard remedy is a suspension of new investments and a vote on whether to continue or wind down.

The customization in side letters typically widens the key-man definition. The base LPA may name only the founder. Your side letter can add additional names or expand the time-commitment standard.

A key-man trigger
If, during the Investment Period, [Named Principal] ceases to devote substantially all of his business time and attention to the affairs of the Fund (a "Key-Man Event"), the General Partner shall promptly notify the undersigned Limited Partner, and the Investment Period shall be suspended for a period of one hundred eighty (180) days, during which time no new Investments may be made without the consent of Limited Partners holding at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the Capital Commitments.

Notice Rights

Notice rights are simple and high-value. They obligate the GP to inform you in advance of certain partnership actions. Standard requests:

  • Pre-investment notification (10 to 15 business days before commitment to a deal)
  • Pre-financing notification (any debt or refinancing above a defined threshold)
  • Pre-sale notification (any disposition above a defined threshold)
  • Litigation and regulatory notification (any matter that could materially affect partnership operations)

Notice rights are particularly important for ERISA-restricted investors and sovereign wealth funds with regulatory pre-clearance requirements. They are also useful for family offices that want the option to pass on certain deals or asset types.

Withdrawal and Transfer Rights

The LPA prohibits withdrawal and restricts transfers. The side letter is where institutional LPs add limited liquidity. The standard requests:

  • Right to transfer to affiliates, family trusts, and estate-planning vehicles without GP consent
  • Right to pledge interest as collateral for portfolio-level borrowing
  • ERISA withdrawal rights (mandatory for plan-asset compliance)
  • Regulatory withdrawal rights (if a change in law makes the investment impermissible)
  • Tax withdrawal rights (if the partnership is reclassified for tax purposes)
A regulatory withdrawal right
Notwithstanding any provision of the Partnership Agreement to the contrary, the undersigned Limited Partner shall have the right, upon thirty (30) days' written notice to the General Partner, to withdraw from the Partnership in whole or in part if the undersigned Limited Partner determines, based on the advice of counsel, that continued participation in the Partnership would (a) cause the undersigned Limited Partner to violate any law, rule, or regulation applicable to it, or (b) cause the assets of the Partnership to be deemed "plan assets" under ERISA or Section 4975 of the Code with respect to the undersigned Limited Partner.

What Is Typically Off the Table

Side letters are flexible but not unlimited. The categories sponsors will not concede in side letters:

  • Lower preferred return or higher promote split. Economic terms below the master deal would breach the GP's good faith obligation to other LPs and create securities law risk.
  • Governance changes that affect other LPs. A side letter cannot give one LP a veto over partnership decisions that bind all LPs.
  • Modifications to the waterfall mechanics. The waterfall is computed at the partnership level. One LP cannot have a fundamentally different waterfall.
  • Removal of fiduciary duties owed to other LPs. A side letter binding only one LP cannot waive the GP's duties to the rest.

What you can get is everything else. Information, notice, MFN protection, fee discounts on your own commitment, co-investment access, customized key-man triggers, regulatory carve-outs, and limited liquidity. The list is long. The cost is asking.

The order of operations

Negotiate the side letter before signing the subscription agreement. Once you have wired and been admitted, your leverage drops to near zero. The window between the GP saying "we want your commitment" and you signing the sub agreement is when the side letter gets done.